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What is the nature of catastrophes? Can major incidents such as the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, the 2003 blackout of the Eastern power grid, 
and the financial meltdown of 2008 be explained by cause-and-effect, or are they simply 
random events in world history? Scientists always look for cause-and-effect, action and 
reaction, logical explanations of the real world, but what if catastrophes are a product of 
randomness? Scientists have failed to accurately predict the consequences of 
earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorist attacks even though a considerable amount of 
effort has been spent on methods of “prediction.” Can we explain catastrophic events as 
the product of some motivating incident or series of incidents, or are we simply fooled 
by randomness?1 
One achievement of western reductionist thought and indeed the scientific method 
itself is the implied ability to explain nearly everything that happens in the natural world 
as cause-and-effect; every cause has an effect, and effects can be traced back to their 
causes.2 If we understand the cause of earthquakes, floods, fires, and terrorist attacks, 
we can do something about them. At least this is the theory. But in practice, discovering 
the cause of catastrophe is mostly an exercise in hindsight. After the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 it was obvious to many in the Intelligence community that an attack was eminent. 
After Hurricane Katrina it was obvious that the infrastructure of New Orleans was long 
overdue for strengthening. After the 2003 blackout, the cause was easily identified and 
rectified. Understanding cause-and-effect is the first step towards prevention, hence the 
urgency for understanding why something disastrous happens. 
But there is another plausible explanation based on complex adaptive systems theory. 
This theory lies halfway between rational cause-and-effect logic and the unpredictability 
of “acts of God.” Essentially, it says that inevitable catastrophe is imbedded within many 
complex systems themselves. These so-called critical systems contain the seeds of their 
own destruction.  Moreover, critical systems move toward the precipice of catastrophe 
rather than away from it, by their very own nature. They are subject to evolutionary 
forces that shape them, and if these forces are not controlled, a critical system evolves 
from a “normal state” to a “critical state”. Because it is a property of the system and its 
evolution, rather than some external force, these systems reach a state of self-organized 
criticality (SOC) under their own power. SOC systems are perched on the edge of chaos, 
near a tipping point between normal operation, and disaster.  
According to the SOC theory, political systems that lead to terrorist attacks, financial 
systems that lead to resounding stock market crashes, electrical power grids that 
experience 100-year magnitude failures every decade, and hurricanes that wipe out 
entire cities are the result of a form of emergence called self-organized criticality. A 
small (random) perturbation in these systems can trip a major collapse, unexpectedly, 
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dramatically, and resoundingly. Because the cause is not obvious (until after the fact), 
and it is often a very minor perturbation, the collapse comes as a shock. Is it possible 
that an unfortunate event is psychologically surprising only because of its magnitude, 
and not because it is unexpected? 
What is the nature of SOC systems, how do infrastructure systems get that way, and 
what can be done to prevent the impending catastrophe? This article develops an 
unconventional theory of infrastructure criticality based on decade-old ideas from a 
variety of disciplines. First, the concept of SOC is explained using three simple 
simulations proposed by Chao Tang Per Bak,3 Mark Newman, and Amaral-Meyers.4 
Each simulation illustrates an aspect of SOC: self-organization, randomness as an 
underlying engine of disaster, and the role of interdependency or connectivity in 
complex systems.  
Next, the discussion shifts to an explanation of a general property shared by many 
major disasters: the fractal power law.5 Power laws turn out to be appropriate proxies 
for the insurance industry measure of likelihood called exceedence probability 
(probability an event will exceed a certain consequence). The power law exceedence 
probability curve is associated with nearly all hazards of interest to homeland security. 
This is no coincidence, but more intriguing is the realization that power law exceedence 
probability curves can be produced from purely underlying randomness. This supports 
the author’s conjecture that catastrophic incidents (often) occur because of randomness 
– not simply cause-and-effect.  
Third, application of the author’s random SOC theory to homeland security risk-
informed decision-making allows us to classify hazards as either low-risk or high-risk. 
Low-risk hazards are associated with risk that actually declines as consequence 
increases, while high-risk hazards are associated with risk that rises. This distinction 
depends on the rate of decline in exceedence probability, and suggests re-thinking of 
critical infrastructure resiliency strategies. But what strategy applies to each class? The 
author argues that a predominantly prevention strategy should be applied to high-risk 
hazards, because they are rare, while a strategy of response should be applied to the 
class of low-risk, high probability hazards. This dual-mode strategy is not entirely 
supported by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan of 2009,6 but makes sense if 
we believe in the NIPP’s risk-informed decision-making policy. 
Sand Piles, Sticks, and Nature 
Per Bak’s simple and elegant illustration of a self-organized system had little to do with 
homeland security, critical infrastructure, or risk-informed decision making. He was 
simply trying to understand the alarming discontinuity that occurs in many complex 
systems that suddenly collapse for apparently no reason. Imagine a sand pile built from 
grains of sand slowly dropping onto a flat surface. Over time a cone-shaped pyramid 
forms. As more and more grains of sand fall on the pile, the cone grows in height and 
breadth. Suddenly a portion of the cone breaks away, causing a landslide or avalanche. 
Per Bak asked if it was possible to predict the size of the landslide and compute exactly 
when the landslide would break away from the cone. As it turns out, the timing and size 
of individual landslides cannot be determined with any precision. Instead, Per Bak 
observed many different sized landslides and plotted them on an exceedence probability 
curve. Interestingly, the sand pile exceedence probability curve is a fat-tailed power law. 
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This curve has subsequently become the center of attraction for scientists from a variety 
of disciplines, because it keeps showing up over and over again. 
Exceedence probability curves like the one in Figure 1 simply plot the likelihood of an 
event such as a landslide occurring of size greater than or equal to x.7 They differ from 
frequency or histogram distributions, because of the “greater than or equal to” part of 
the definition of exceedence. Exceedence probability curves are used by the insurance 
industry to compute maximum expected loss due to a calamity, which is a form of risk. 
Multiplying exceedence probability times consequence yields probable maximum loss 
or PML risk, which is used as the basis for calculating insurance premiums. For 
example, the point in Figure 1 where the exceedence probability is 20% appears along 
the x-axis at x = 3, which is the likelihood of a landslide of size 3, 4, 5, … or 10. PML risk 
at this point is (0.20 x 3 = 0.6). This says that the probability of an event with 




Figure 1. Exceedence probability is a power law: EP(x) = x -q; where q is an exponent defining the rate of 
decline of the curve. The probability of an incident with consequence equal to or greater than x falls 
dramatically as the consequence of the incident increases. A power law is “fat- or long-tailed”, because it 
declines slower than an exponential function. 
 
Repeating Per Bak’s sand pile experiment many times, and measuring the sizes of 
landslides, we find that small landslides occur much more often than large ones. 
Extremely large landslides are extremely rare, but not impossible. Small incidents are 
much more common, but their consequences are much less. If the size and timing of 
each landslide were truly random, the exceedence probability curve would be S-shaped 
rather than shaped like a power law. The fact that an exceedence probability curve obeys 
a power law suggests a deeper meaning. The meaning of exceedence probability is 
probed further in this paper. Interestingly, real earthquakes obey a power law with 
exponent q = 0.41, as seen in Table 1 at the end of this article. [The larger the exponent, 
the more abruptly the curve declines as shown in Figure 1]. 
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Per Bak’s playful sand pile demonstration became known as the BTW experiment – 
from the initials of the three authors of the 1987 publication describing it.8 Its profound 
impact on a variety of disciplines is why so many writers from across many fields of 
study continue to reference and use it as the canonical illustration of SOC. Mark 
Buchanan may have been the first popular writer to note the generality of SOC, power 
laws, and catastrophes, but many others have adopted it as their own.9 Malcolm 
Gladwell’s popular “tipping point” book introduced the BTW experiment to a wider 
audience,10 and more recently, Joshua Cooper Ramo’s ”concept of world disorder” 
equates SOC with the unthinkable.11 SOC, power laws, and randomness seem to be a 
common property of both natural and human-made catastrophes. 
At first glance the BTW experiment seems too specialized to apply broadly to 
homeland security and infrastructure protection. However, Buchanan’s treatise on 
catastrophe provides additional evidence of the generality of SOC. Consider Buchanan’s 
description of an experiment proposed by Mark Newman that illustrates the role of 
randomness in SOC. Newman’s experiment (see Figure 2) is strikingly real and yet 
simple. Consider a collection of sticks varying in length from 0 to 100% (choose your 
own units of measurement – it doesn’t matter).  Repeatedly produce a random 
threshold number T, between zero and 100%, representing the length of survivor sticks. 
Replace sticks of length less than T with new sticks that are also of random length 




Figure 2. Newman’s Sticks: Sticks shorter than randomly selected threshold value T are replaced with 
sticks of randomly selected length, see six rows of sticks in top panel. Consequence is defined as the 
number of replaced sticks after each incident. The upper plot is experimentally obtained exceedence 
probability and the lower plot is experimentally obtained “number of survivors versus time”.  Download 
and run the Catastrophes simulation [.jar] at http://www.chds.us/?media/openmedia&alt&id=2260.12 
In this experiment, consequence is equal to the number of replaced sticks on each round 
of replacements. The exceedence probability curve is obtained by placing the fraction of 
replaced sticks into bins of size 1%, 2%, 3%.... 100% consequence, and normalizing the 
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fractions so they add up to 100%. Exceedence probability EP(x ≥ Consequence) is the 
sum of the subtotals in bins 100%, 99%, 98%… x%. That is, exceedence probability is the 
probability that x or more percent of the sticks are replaced after each round.   
The exceedence probability of this experiment is a power law like the exceedence 
probability curve of the BTW experiment. And they are both shaped like the curve in 
Figure 1. These two seemingly different examples produce power laws – with possibly 
different exponents. Power laws are fractal or self-similar (they look the same at all 
scales – magnifying a portion of Figure 1 produces a curve just like Figure 1). Regardless 
of the scale used to measure consequence, the resulting curve has the same power law 
shape. Because of the fractal or self-similar property of power laws, small incidents are 
just miniature versions of large incidents.  
Scientists from a number of fields of study have observed hazards and recorded their 
exceedence probability curves and found they are re-scaled power law fractals (see Table 
I). Hence, power law incidents are also called scale-free. Whether the incident is an 
earthquake, hurricane, terrorist attack, airline accident, or power grid failure, they all 
obey a power law. Thus, fractals, self-similar, and scale-free are simply different terms 
for the same power law property. Self-similarity is the important concept, because it 
relates small and large consequences to an underlying randomness. 
The rate of decline of the exceedence probability curve differs for different classes of 
catastrophe as shown in Table I, but they are all self-similar fractals. This intriguing 
result suggests a cause-and-effect, but in fact the author shows that power laws are 
produced by an underlying randomness, independent of any cause-and-effect. If an 
underlying cause-and-effect existed, the exceedence probability would not be a power 
law. For example, both BTW and the Newman stick simulation have an underlying 
randomness that produces a power law. But fatal automobile accidents in the USA do 
not.13  
Normal Accidents 
Charles Perrow’s 1984 book, Normal Accidents, pre-dates the BTW experiment.14 Even 
so, Perrow suggested that accidents such as the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant 
disaster were caused by many small fractures or failures building up into bigger failures. 
He recognized that disaster is the end-result of interactions internal to complex, highly 
connected systems. His near-encyclopedic treatment of accidents always led to the same 
conclusion: accidents are normal (as in to-be-expected) because of system complexity 
and connectivity. In reference to the Three Mile Island incident, Perrow says, “The cause 
of the accident is to be found in the complexity of the system….It is the interaction of the 
multiple failures that explains the accident.”15  
Small incidents spread and magnify into larger incidents as in the SOC model, but 
Perrow added an element: fractures in complex systems propagate via various forms of 
connection or links among the parts of the system. In other words, complex systems are 
networks. Their interacting parts are network nodes and their interactions travel via 
network links connecting them. This idea is dramatically illustrated by the simple “food 
network” experiment proposed by Amaral and Meyer, and described by Buchanan. 









Figure 3. Amaral-Meyer Network: Fractures or “extinctions” percolate up from random extinctions of 
nodes at the lowest level of the six-level network. Nodes go extinct whenever all links below them are 
removed. Consequence is defined as the number of extinctions following each random extinction 
occurring at the lowest level. Upper plot is the exceedence probability curve, and lower plot shows 
number of survivors versus time.  Download and run the Catastrophes simulation [.jar] at 
http://www.chds.us/?media/openmedia&alt&id=2260.17   
 
Consider a six-tiered ecological or “food network” consisting of niches, represented by 
nodes in Figure 3, and links, represented by lines connecting pairs of nodes. Nodes are 
colored black if they are occupied by a surviving species, and colored white, if 
unoccupied. Amaral and Meyer imagined a world in which species at each level 
occasionally and randomly mutate and fill an empty node or slot above, below, or on 
either side of themselves (at the same level). Mutations occur with small probability and 
tend to increase the population of occupied nodes, as long as they can link to at least one 
occupied node immediately below them. Linking establishes a food chain, supporting 
nodes above, but not below or at the same level. If a node is unable to establish a link, or 
if the link is broken because the lower-level node becomes extinct, the upper-level node 
also becomes extinct. 
A curious thing happens when a lower-level node randomly goes extinct and all of its 
links are removed. This small “accident” propagates to all of the nodes connected to the 
removed node. If all links are removed from a node in a level above the extinction, it too 
becomes extinct. The accident is propagated up to the next level by repeatedly removing 
links to higher-level nodes, etc. The Amaral-Meyer network simulates Perrow’s normal 
accidents.  
The supply of new nodes is replenished by mutations and diminished as extinctions 
remove them, so what eventually happens in the long run? The number of nodes 
steadily increases as the population fills out nodes and expands across levels. Then 
growth levels off and stays level for a long period of time (dictated by the rate of 
extinctions and the rate of mutations). Suddenly and unpredictably the network 
collapses. Like the BTW experiment, the timing of this collapse is unpredictable, but its 
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exceedence probability obeys a fractal power law. This suggests randomness as the 
underlying property of network collapse, rather than individual extinctions.18  
Meltdowns 
The Amaral-Meyer network may model many natural and human-made complex 
systems that unexpectedly fail after a long period of stability. Typically, these systems 
crash following a small, unassuming incident that upsets the system’s equilibrium 
rendering it unstable. The timing and size of consequence cannot be predicted ahead of 
time. But, eventually the Amaral-Meyer network self-organizes into a state of criticality 
and collapses. It is a beautiful illustration of SOC.  
Figure 4 casts the 2008 financial meltdown as an Amaral-Meyer network.19 This 
complex system had at least four levels of financial institutions, all dependent on lower 
level “feeder nodes”. Prior to the financial collapse, feeder nodes made loans, sold them 
to the nodes directly above them, which in turn packaged mortgage-backed securities 
together and sold them to upper level nodes. Eventually, the packaged securities and 
packaged credit default swap derivatives were sold to non-USA investors at the top level 
of this food network. As the number of links increased over time, the financial network 
evolved toward a self-organized criticality. In this case, criticality emerged because the 
number of network connections around “overly connected” institutions meant the 
institution was directly and indirectly connected to virtually all others. Like the BTW 





Figure 4. 2008 Financial Meltdown Network: A few of the nodes of a financial food network representing 
the financial system as of late 2008. Links are representative, only. The financial network is strikingly 
similar to a four-level Amaral-Meyer food network.   
Small numbers of extinctions have little overall effect unless they propagate along 
connections and spread to most other institutions. But the “no propagation assumption” 
turned out to be false, because the network became self-organized. As the network 
evolved, links between levels increased as well as the number of nodes, causing the 
network to edge ever closer to its tipping point. The closer the network came to its 
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maximum capacity (all nodes connected to all others below them) the closer it came to 
its critical point. The built-up network eventually collapsed; not because a large 
financial institution like Lehman Brothers was too big to fail, but because it was too 
heavily connected. (One can argue that Lehman Brothers Inc. was both big and 
connected, but its connectivity is what made it critical). 
FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS 
The foregoing simulations and the real world suggest that catastrophe is a combination 
of self-organized criticality, randomness, and self-similar system architecture. 
Newman’s Stick experiment illustrates the impact of a random external incident on 
failure of a simple system: extinctions may be caused by random externalities. The 
Amaral-Meyer experiment illustrates the impact of criticality in a connected system, 
whereby catastrophic failure is intrinsic to the system itself. Such systems can fail 
without any outside influence.  
These simple simulations suggest randomness as an alternative explanation for 
catastrophes. They support Perrow’s normal accident theory, but moreover, they can be 
explained as purely random phenomena. The author performed an even simpler 
simulation based on purely random number generation, and obtained results identical 
to the BTW experiment, Sticks, and Amaral-Meyer simulations (see Figure 5). 
Randomness yields consequences that obey a power law, independent of any hazard. 




Figure 5. Random Catastrophes. Upper plot shows results of multiplying six random numbers together to 
obtain consequence. The lower plot shows the size of these random consequences versus time. The 
upper plot shows the exceedence probability obtained by placing thousands of random products into bins 
and tallying them.  Download and run the Catastrophes simulation [.jar] at 
http://www.chds.us/?media/openmedia&alt&id=2260.20 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The random SOC theory described here provides an alternate explanation for financial 
system meltdowns, earthquakes, power grid blackouts, and epidemics that sometimes 
flare up instead of dying off. We know that many of our critical infrastructure sectors 
have reached their self-organized criticality.21 Overly-connected hubs are found in the 
public switched telecommunications network, near-capacity tie lines in the power grid, 
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congestion on highways, lack of surge capacity in hospitals, and viruses worming their 
way through the Internet. Fortunately, an understanding of SOC suggests new 
strategies. 
Several mechanisms can be used to reverse self-organized criticality.  Of course, the 
problem can be solved at the engineering level: addition of surge capacity, operating 
systems below capacity, and restructuring networks to back them away from SOC. Each 
of these solutions has corresponding costs, however, and is the subject of another paper. 
A more global solution is to change regulatory policy, affecting infrastructures across the 
entire nation. Re-design of regulation is a better approach, because it spreads the 
economic burden across the entire industry. An overhaul of regulatory policy can 
reshape these critical infrastructures, backing them away from SOC. Sub-SOC systems 
are more resilient, which means they withstand failures with lower consequences. 
For example, the electric power grid has evolved into a state of self-organized 
criticality after decades of operating at near capacity, compounded by incremental 
patching of its transmission network. Regulatory policies that motivate the utilities to 
build out more transmission capacity or promote locally-distributed generation 
(reducing the need for transmission capacity) would reduce the sector’s criticality. A 
similar criticality exists in the communications sector due to the rise of 
telecommunications hotels.22 The existence of telecom hotel hubs is a direct 
consequence of the 1996 Telecommunications Act that advocates peering among 
competitors and promotes co-location of switching equipment. This regulation needs to 
be changed before a normal accident results in a national telecommunications blackout. 
Similar self-organized criticalities exist in other infrastructure sectors. Financial 
systems tend to self-organize into criticality; public health/hospital systems have 
inadequate surge capacity; the World Wide Web/Internet is notoriously near its critical 
point with respect to denial of service attacks, worms, and cyber threats. However, these 
second-tier infrastructures have not been thoroughly studied from this new perspective. 
This work needs to be done.  
Table I enumerates two classes of hazards to infrastructure: low risk and high risk. 
Hazards with a power law exponent greater than or equal to one are considered low risk, 
while hazards with a power law exponent less than one are considered high risk. The 
high-low distinction is shown in Figure 6 as a risk curve that increases as consequence 
increases (high risk), versus a curve that decreases, after initially increasing. This 
classification of hazards has important implications for risk-informed decision making.  
To illustrate the application of this theory to an existing infrastructure, consider 
results for the telecommunications sector, circa 1990.23 Data collected by Richard Kuhn 
and analyzed by the author was used to construct the exceedence probability curve, and 
then plugged into the PML risk equation to obtain the high-risk curve of Figure 6. 
Consequence was measured in millions of customer-minutes lost due to all kinds of 
incidents. As you can see, high-risk systems rise more-or-less monotonically, as 
consequence increases. The telecommunications system studied by Kuhn exhibits high-
risk self-organized criticality. 
The form of these curves has an interesting bearing on strategy. Risk-informed 
decision making recommends prioritization of investments according to risk: buy down 
high-risk assets starting with the highest risk. In Table I, risk is highest when 
consequences are small for low-risk hazards such as airline accidents, floods, terrorism, 
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and large fires in cities. Conversely, risk increases with consequence for high-risk 
hazards such as hurricanes, earthquakes, wars, whooping cough, and measles, which 




Figure 6. PML Risk versus Consequence for low- and high-risk exceedence probability curves. Exponent 
q is shown for power law equivalents. The low-risk curve (q = 1.5) is hypothetical, while the high-risk (q = 
0.85) was obtained by analyzing telecommunications outages reported by Kuhn.24 Note: PML risk 
decreases for low-risk hazards as consequence increases. This is illustrated by the lower curve. 
Should a prevention strategy be applied to high-risk, low-probability hazards, because 
they are rare? Similarly, a response policy might be appropriate for low-risk, frequent 
hazards, because risk is highest for small consequence incidents. Perhaps an 80-20 
percent rule should be applied: invest 80 percent in prevention and 20 percent in 
response for high-risk hazards; and invest 80 percent in response and 20 percent in 
prevention for low-risk hazards. This dual-mode strategy avoids the dangers of putting 
all eggs in one basket. 
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